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NOBLE CONTINENT?
German-Speaking Nobles as Theorists of European 
Identity in the Interwar Period
[\
Dina Gusejnova
Speaking in the aftermath of the Second World War at Zurich University, Winston 
Churchill characterized the preceding decades as a time of ‘frightful nationalistic 
quarrels, originated by the Teutonic nations’. Europe, this ‘noble continent, 
comprising on the whole the fairest and the most cultivated regions of the earth, 
enjoying a temperate and equable climate, is the home of all the great parent races 
of the western world’. It is to ‘protect’ its heritage for the world, Churchill argued, 
using the example of the ‘ancient States and Principalities of the Germany of former 
days’, to which, in his words, ‘western civilization’ owed much, that Europe had to 
unite politically.1 Churchill’s statement deserves attention not only for its rhetoric, 
characterized by a deliberate attempt to claim from Hitler his own account of 
Europe’s racial superiority. It is a curious document also due to its peculiar 
genealogy of European heritage, one that contains a positive reference to the 
principalities of ‘former’ Germany, along with a negative evaluation of the ‘Teutonic 
nations’. The contrast between the ‘Teutonic nations’ and the ‘states and 
principalities of the Germany of former days’ is so starkly drawn, in fact, that it 
appears as if centuries were separating these two phenomena, or, as if they 
constituted two entirely unrelated branches in its genealogical tree.2 But most 
German principalities only lost their political autonomy in 1918, together with 
Prussia – in Churchill’s eyes at least, one of the most ‘Teutonic’ of all the German 
nations. Moreover, German princes have historically been instrumental in shaping 
the identity not just of the ‘Teutonic nations’, but also those of the British: the 
monarch to whom Churchill himself was subject was of German origin, even 
though the Saxe-Coburg-Gothas had changed their name to the more patriotic 
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‘Windsor’ during the ﬁ rst of the ‘nationalistic quarrels’, in 1917, to avoid confusion 
with their ‘Teutonic’ enemies. Was Churchill’s rhetorically powerful, yet obfuscating 
confusion, just an attempt to negate the effects those very Teutonic ‘quarrels’ had 
on the construction of a workable political ideology of European identity?
As I will show, the crisis of the nobility as a sociopolitical conﬁ guration in 
Germany and Europe after 1918 meant that ‘nobility’, German-ness, and the idea 
of Europe, became deeply intertwined political identities. The concept of a 
‘European’ politics was shaped by speciﬁ c perspectives, or, as Reinhart Koselleck 
calls them, ‘horizons of experience’ and ‘expectation’.3 Churchill’s own idea of 
Europe, like that of other British conservatives such as Leo Amery or Christopher 
Dawson, reﬂ ected the profound inﬂ uence of German intellectuals of noble descent 
who became the chief spokesmen for European uniﬁ cation in the interwar period.4 
Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Paneuropa 
movement and the most prominent noble Europeanist of the interwar period, had 
spent the last years of the war in exile, a ‘Bohemian citizen of the world turned 
visiting professor of history at New York University’, as Time magazine described 
his activities in wartime New York.5 Other noble theorists of European identity 
who were based either in Germany or Austria after the First World War included 
Count Hermann Keyserling, a vitalist philosopher of culture who attained much 
wider fame both in German-speaking and in international circles, and Prince Karl 
Anton Rohan. A young follower of Keyserling, Rohan became the editor of the 
inﬂ uential literary and political journal Europäische Revue. Prince Hubertus zu 
Löwenstein, Count Ferdinand Czernin, Baron von Waldburg-Zeil, Baron von 
Rheinbaben, and Otto von Habsburg, claimant to the Habsburg throne, were 
among the other prominent theorists of ‘high’ noble descent. Members of the 
‘lower’ nobility – that is, descendants of ennobled subjects of the former German 
or Austro-Hungarian empires – who engaged in constructions of European 
identity in their publications included the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal and the 
maecenas, diplomat, and dandy, Count Harry Kessler. The idea of a European 
crisis of values connected with a social crisis permeated the work of noble 
Europeanists of Christian conservative, liberal and social democratic dispositions. 
On the Christian conservative side, Friedrich August von der Heydte advocated 
the need for recreating a Holy Roman Empire for those reasons.6 All these thinkers 
had advocated some idea of Europeanist politics in the interwar period, but in the 
course of the rise of Nazism and the Second World War, their paths split. In 
Germany and Austria after 1918, nobles saw themselves compelled actively to 
reclaim a new form of authority as intellectuals. Authors such as Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Hermann Keyserling, and Karl-Anton Rohan, who have 
been described as ‘elitist’ by contemporaries and by more recent critics, the 
chapter argues, can also be understood as (self-reﬂ exive) ‘aristocratic radicals’.7 
The aim of this study is to reconstruct their perspective on European identity 
prior to this parting of ways in the later 1930s.
Different political communities and social groups, from families to residents of 
cities, to religious or ethnic groups, are affected by political upheavals in divergent 
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ways. As Michael Müller rightly remarks, the idea of Europe has frequently been 
shaped by the geographically peripheral, or otherwise ‘marginal’ elites.8 As 
theorists of Europe, noble writers gave their own biographies a new political 
signiﬁ cance. Each of their theoretical conceptions of Europe had the image of the 
new European as its central conceptual feature. Europe for them was not a way of 
‘conceptualising a continent’, as Anthony Pagden has put it, but rather a way of 
‘conceptualising’ themselves in a new socio-political landscape.9 The diffuse 
meaning of what is ‘European’ today thus carries the baggage of these diverse 
experiences. To understand these different meanings, we need to disentangle how 
their speciﬁ c perspectives shaped the way theorists envisioned future politics.
These writers and political thinkers have been remembered individually for 
different things and in different contexts, which turned some of them into 
historically exceptional, almost unlikely, cosmopolitans, expiated others of any 
complicity with ideologies such as fascism, and obscured the very obvious 
commonality between them: the experience of a crisis of social status in a period 
of ‘democratization’, which coincided with constructions of European identity. 
This shared experience is not only an ideal-typical and retrospective inference of 
commonality, but was rooted in their networks of sociability, which also 
substantially overlapped with their networks of publishing houses and journals in 
which they voiced their theories. 
Not all these men – and the theorists of European identity in the interwar 
period were almost exclusively male – were still being remembered by scholars of 
European identity in the period after the Second World War. Some of them, like 
Count Harry Kessler, who died in exile from Nazi Germany in 1937, or Count 
Hermann Keyserling, who died in 1946, only had a very limited impact on 
European politics after the Second World War. Others, like the poet and playwright 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal, are primarily known for other intellectual contributions. 
Some, such as the Prussian Baron Rheinbaben, became advocates of Nazi visions 
of Europe and were thus omitted from the history books on European identity. In 
the remaining group of émigrés from Nazi Europe during the 1940s, Coudenhove-
Kalergi, Otto von Habsburg and Prince Löwenstein are probably the best known, 
yet here again it was only Coudenhove who was, for a time, celebrated as a direct 
ancestor, or even founding father, of the European Union. Habsburg’s restorationist 
rhetoric made him an unlikely candidate for this role. As the New York Times had 
put it in 1940: ‘Few among all these hundreds of thousands of young men who 
have in these past 500 years crossed the Atlantic seeking to amend their shattered 
fortunes have seemed engaged on such a forlorn hope as Otto von Habsburg.’10 
Upon his return to Europe after the war, Habsburg’s alliance with Franco’s Spain 
through the ‘Centre Européen d’Information et Documentation’, a stronghold of 
European conservatism, made him an unsuitable candidate for the political 
construction of democratic Europe, whose educational institutions also shaped 
the historiographical analysis of Europe’s political and intellectual identity.11 The 
most lasting inﬂ uence of noble perspectives on Europeanist ideology after the 
Second World War was that of the predominantly Christian and non-Fascist 
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constructions of Europe, expounded by thinkers such as Fürst Löwenstein, and 
the oecumenical-technocratic conception of Paneuropa-man Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
whose earlier ﬂ irtations with Mussolini’s fascism, however, had been conveniently 
forgotten by the 1990s.
Starting from the transformation of these former units of political organization 
in the German Empire, to the abolition of all forms of nobility in both Germany 
and Austria, the signiﬁ cance of the abolition of the old nobility in Germany and 
Austria on the political imagination of this period has been underestimated. The 
year 1918 was a turning point that started a new controversy in German political 
and intellectual circles concerning the status of the historical nobility.12 In this 
discourse, German-speaking nobles as theorists of Europe understood the 
period not only as a Spenglerian ‘decline of the West’, but particularly as a 
decline of the status and values of the old nobility which they saw as the agent 
of Europe’s cultural production in former days. With the idea of Europe, they 
reinvented the feudal cosmopolitanism of the historical nobility by endorsing a 
new and positive concept of Europe. The more existential experience of the 
crisis of the nobility for nobles gave them speciﬁ c discursive weapons that 
allowed them to turn part of the debate concerning the nobility into a debate 
about the future of Europe.
The views of European history and politics displayed by nobles in interwar 
public discourses had three points in common. First, the idea that states and their 
governments were secondary in international politics to private networks; second, 
the idea that the nation could only be accepted as a temporary political paradigm, 
and that a form of supranational identity was needed in Europe; ﬁ nally, the 
acknowledgement that the social foundations of European cultural excellence, 
which rested on the contribution of aristocratic societies, needed to be 
reinterpreted, because the old elites failed to respond to the pressing problems of 
their times. In their accounts, 1918 appeared as a historic caesura. Nobles utilized 
the emerging structures of liberal internationalism, represented in the League of 
Nations, but did so with the aim of a post-national European community; they 
insisted on government by social likeness rather than party politics. They 
attributed to a new nobility the role not just of a privileged elite, but of one whose 
very task is to link family history with public history, to be the guardians of 
European heritage. Nobles became ‘idea-mongers’ linking very different traditions 
of imagining Europe together. To explain their political views, we need to 
understand better the social change that occurred in Germany and Austria and 
affected circles of intellectuals in particular ways. 
Nobles and the Crisis of 1918
‘German Princes and Nobility Rush Funds to Neutral Lands’, the Geneva 
correspondent for the New York Times cited a Swiss banker in October 1918. ‘A 
large proportion of the depositors’ bringing their money from Germany and 
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Austria’, the journalist remarked, ‘belong to the princely families, posing under 
assumed names.’13 Between 1917 and 1920, not just Germany and Austria, but 
most of Eastern and Central Europe witnessed an extraordinary number of 
sociopolitical changes involving political demands to abolish the nobility. These 
not only enforced the abdication of the Habsburg, Romanov, and Hohenzollern 
emperors in the wake of the First World War, but also brought about the abolition 
of noble titles and the expropriation of other noble families. The process did not 
leave many ‘neutral lands’ for nobles. 
The geopolitical and social transformations in Europe after the First World War 
had a particular impact on nobles associated with German culture; that is, 
members of families who had historically been loyal to the Hohenzollern or the 
Habsburg family. ‘German’ nobles in this sense occupied elite positions in the 
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. In 1919, the new republican 
parliaments of Germany and Austria decreed the abolition of the nobility.14 The 
new government of Austria passed a law concerning the ‘abolition [Aufhebung] of 
the nobility, its external privileges and titles awarded as a sign of distinction 
associated with civil service, profession, or a scientiﬁ c or artistic capacity’. After 
1919, nobles were to become ‘German Austrian citizens’, equal before the law in 
all respects.15 The German Constitutional Assembly ratiﬁ ed the abolition of the 
nobility as §181 and §109 of the Weimar Constitution, giving this event primary 
political importance.16 Those nobles who had organized themselves in noble 
corporations such as the Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft (DAG) in the late German 
Empire, were now explicitly discouraged from party political participation. 
Following a ﬁ rst law of June 1920 ‘concerning the abolition of the privileges of the 
nobility and the dissolution of their estates’ passed by the German government, in 
1929 German President Gustav Stresemann demanded that membership in the 
DAG was unacceptable for members of the Reichstag, the cabinet as well as the 
army, spurring a ﬂ ood of protests in noble circles.17 Many members of the DAG, 
already a conservative organization with clear anti-Semitic inﬂ uences prior to 
1933, moved further to the right and found themselves in the ranks of the Nazi 
Party a decade later.18
Outside Germany, the crisis of the nobility in the period from 1919 until the 
occupation by Nazi Germany affected nobles of a German cultural background 
beyond the boundaries of what in 1918 became the German and the Austrian 
republics. German noble families of old lineage such as the Teutonic knights that 
had served a number of changing polities from the Swedish and Lithuanian 
kingdoms to the German and Russian empires, and branches of other European 
noble families that historically had been loyal to the Austrian Habsburgs, formed 
the core of the political elite in regions formerly belonging to the Russian, Austro-
Hungarian and German empires, which had now formed new nation-states. This 
was especially pronounced in the Baltic region, where the Keyserlings formed part 
of the feudal elite, and in Bohemia, where Coudenhove-Kalergi was based. After 
1918–20, in the new Baltic nation-states and in Czechoslovakia, such families no 
longer epitomized a functional political elite. The high proportion of nobles from 
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these regions among the aristocratic writers whose subject was the idea of Europe 
was deeply entangled with this geopolitical and social transformation. 
In the new nation-states of Eastern and Central Europe, other varieties of 
abolishing the nobility ‘in the name of the nation’ emerged in the early 1920s. 
There, nobles were considered to be ‘foreign’ elements who were also historical 
enemies of nations in the making. Thus in Czechoslovakia, the new governments 
required the conﬁ scation of property on the grounds of nobles’ foreign background, 
and only in the second place as a betrayal of other social groups or the nation. 
Politicians like the representative of the Czech National Democratic Party, Bohumil 
Ne˘mec, argued that ‘nationally foreign … and rapacious noble families’ had been 
causing harm to the Czech nation throughout history.19 His, ironically, Slavic 
surname, which means ‘German’, in fact gives some linguistic evidence to the case 
that the arguments for a policy of ethnic purity in this region were deeply ﬂ awed 
given the historically mixed populations in these areas. What mattered with regard 
to nobles was that they were both foreign and formed part of the Habsburg imperial 
elite. In Czechoslovakia, the imperial nobility backed by the ancient power of the 
Habsburgs in the region, became but an ethnic German minority, which the new 
governments viewed on a par with other Germans like the Sudeten Germans.20 
Following this line of argument, large noble estates were partially nationalized. In 
Estonia and the other new Baltic nation-states, a similar process occurred. In both 
cases, German nobles obtained the citizenship of the new states, but were effectively 
barred from any political participation, or from exercising their traditional feudal 
privileges like holding courts (as in the case of the Baltic knights).
The abolition of the nobility in these postimperial peripheries was therefore 
entangled with a reconceptualization of notions of nobility and aristocracy, ethnicity 
and social status, and minority and majority in political debates. Nobles like the 
elder brother of the Europeanist Karl Anton Rohan, Prince Alain Rohan, not only 
became ‘lords’ by profession, as new documents attested, but also now belonged to 
a German minority in a Czechoslovakian nation-state. In such regions, this was 
above all a crisis of the German nobility, not because noble families like the 
Keyserlings or the Coudenhoves were German (they were only partially of German 
descent), but because they were now ‘perceived’ as German. In response, while 
many high noble families from Bohemia sought to restore their authority through 
identiﬁ cation with forms of German nationalism, allying with the Sudeten Germans 
and seeking unity between Germany and Austria, there were also many nobles who, 
especially in the early 1920s, sought direct protection from the League of Nations 
under its ‘ethnic minorities’ act. Only when the league showed its incapacity to 
enact its vision did these groups move closer to the German nationalists.
Consecutive governments in Germany, Austria, and other Central European 
states after 1918 gave different answers to the question ‘What is noble?’ at different 
points in the interwar period. In this light, it seems fairly difﬁ cult to give a tight 
description of the nature of the ‘crisis of the nobility’ in the period from 1918 to 
1920. To use Max Weber’s analysis, depending on the region and the family, some 
nobles still constituted a feudal estate whose power rested as much on their 
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material superiority as on other forms of authority. For example, Alain Rohan, the 
head of the Rohan family of exiles from revolutionary France who had lived under 
Habsburg protection in Bohemia since the nineteenth century, retained his estate 
at Sychrov, Czechoslovakia, after 1919. Here, as diaries and archives of other 
noblemen like Friedrich Thun attest, nobles maintained their old lifestyle of the 
high nobility of the Habsburg Empire, continuing at least into the late 1930s. By 
contrast, in Germany, princes such as Grand Duke Ernst Herzog of Hesse-
Darmstadt, lost their power as feudal sovereigns in 1919, or their income from 
feudal estates. Such was also the case for the Baltic nobility whose estates were 
expropriated by the new national governments of Estonia and Lithuania. Yet in 
other cases, nobles, who in economic respects were members of the upper 
bourgeois class, did not suffer ﬁ nancial losses in 1918, but rather, were hit by the 
international economic crisis of 1929. 
As far as the perception of noble identity and values in Nazi ideology was 
concerned, nobility played an ambivalent role. The Nazi government partially 
reinstated some noble privileges after 1935, and indeed managed to create 
attractive positions in power for nobles such as Gottfried von Bismarck or the von 
Hessen family, while also maintaining its image as a revolutionary and socialist 
party.21 Thus, in keeping with republican legislation, under the Nazis, noble titles 
continued to be seen as part of the family name. Nobles were mere ‘members of 
families with a noble name’, although the regime itself opened up more exclusive 
opportunities for nobles than the Weimar Republic.22 Nobles were ‘recruited’ for 
active collaboration with the regime in connection with the conquest of Eastern 
Europe. Following the Hitler–Stalin pact of 1939, Hitler’s ‘chief ideologue’ for 
Eastern colonization, Alfred Rosenberg, invited nobles from the Baltic region to 
lead the colonization of parts of Poland and Ukraine and to employ their 
knowledge of agricultural organization since ‘feudal’ times for a new economic 
exploitation of the region, using forced Polish labour. For this purpose, the Nazis 
even brieﬂ y reinstated the Teutonic order, the medieval knighthood which 
established the legal stronghold of German aristocrats in the Baltic region, which 
were abolished by the nationalist governments of Estonia and Lithuania.
Ideologically, the Nazi vision of Europe drew much from the symbolic historical 
imagination of the European nobility. The Nazi foreign propaganda journal Signal, 
for instance, edited by former co-editor of the Europäische Revue, Max Clauss, in 
1944 supplied a ‘genealogical tree’ of the generic Aryan family with its journal.
The map shows to what extent the ideological exploitation of noble identity by 
the Nazis parted ways from its original. Like genealogical trees of noble families, 
this tree contains elements of heraldry along with the image of a tree, yet it 
remains abstract in its attempt to link the ‘geographical’, European, identity of the 
Nazi regime to the non-concrete, ‘universal’ family on the top of the tree, while 
differentiating the ‘evil’ branches of the tree in negative heraldic and geographically 
detached form. By contrast, traditional genealogies of noble families that emerged 
in the early modern period but became particularly fashionable in the historicist 
nineteenth century, emphasized the concretes of one particular family whose story 
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was being told, and reserved heraldic images to that family only. To the extent that 
the coat of arms was a symbol, it was a symbol of a family, rather than an entire 
ethnic group, as for the Nazis. Conversely, in terms of political practice, the initial 
promise by Rosenberg to the old Baltic nobles that in colonizing the East, they 
would also restore the ancient knighthoods, was soon being broken. As early as 
1941, these knighthoods were again abolished and replaced by the Nazis’ own 
neo-medieval Gau structures, while German nobles were not returned to their 
original territories in the Baltic but were forced to colonize Southern Poland 
instead.23 Thus, by 1942, while nobles continued occupying some high ranks in 
the army and administration of Nazi Germany, there was also an increasing 
propensity to resist Hitler among noble-dominated social networks such as the 
Kreisau and the Stauffenberg circle. This rising proportion of nobles in resistance 
circles towards the end of the Nazi empire, by contrast to the early resisters of 
mostly working-class background, has led to the postwar image of ‘the nobility’ at 
large being resistant to Nazism, one that has only recently been qualiﬁ ed. 
The events of 1917–20 were not only a socioeconomic crisis of the nobility, but 
also an intellectual one: the very idea of the removal of the nobility as 
de-aristocratization and democratization surfaced simultaneously in different 
successor states to the Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov empires that 
disintegrated during the First World War. The discourse concerning the future of 
the nobility continued in these states throughout the interwar period. It is in this 
respect that the abolition of the nobility contributed to the discourse of Europeanism 
in a particular way. By analysing the meaning of ‘Europe’ for nobles, the chapter 
proposes in some sense a narrower focus than previous studies of interwar 
Europeanism; but in another sense, it hopes to open up new comparative 
perspectives on interwar political thought and social history by referring to the 
abolition of the nobility as a pivotal moment in the history of Europeanist discourses.
Nobles and Interwar Ideas of Europe
Nobles found themselves in opposition to the neo-Jacobin politics of nation 
building that dominated the politics of the early Weimar and Austrian republics, 
which entailed a search for a national community deﬁ ned by ethnic and social 
homogeneity. Recent scholars have identiﬁ ed the circles that formed the archipelagic 
landscape of intellectual life in Germany and Austria by looking at groups of 
authors that published in similar journals or shared similar circles of sociability.24 
When we look at some of the more prominent authors publishing works on the 
idea of Europe during the interwar years in Germany and Austria, the high number 
of nobles in this group catches the eye. For members of the nobility, after 1918 the 
idea of Europe provided above all the chance to contribute to a restructuring of the 
political landscape in which they could maintain their social status. In order to do 
so, many resorted to radically utopian ideas and entirely new paradigms of thought. 
Historical imagination was a constitutive part of noble self-understanding. Today, 
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in fact, its speciﬁ c memory remains one of the main identifying criteria for noble 
identity, as anthropological comparisons between noble and ‘bourgeois’ interviewees 
have shown. Nobles tend to remember several generations more than other social 
groups.25 What is important for nobles as political thinkers in this regard is the fact 
that nobles often tend to consider themselves in some sense personally connected 
with the diplomatic and territorial history of several states. By contrast, after 1918, 
nobles in Central and Eastern Europe had to choose new forms of political identity. 
This historical imagination placed personal claims on what often was the history of 
the entire European continent, which nobles traditionally represented with the 
paradigm of family lineage.26
The abolition of the nobility affected nobles’ political imagination in ways that 
contradicted the politics of tabula rasa of the new republican governments of 
Germany and Austria. By far the greatest number of nobles identiﬁ ed with 
conservative, particularly with Christian, positions. Parties such as the Catholic 
‘Zentrum’ in Germany, or the Austrian People’s Party, journals such as Abendland 
and Hochland, owned by the Waldburg-Zeil family, provided points of identiﬁ cation 
for many nobles who looked either to a restoration of noble privilege, or the 
formation of a neo-medieval corporatist society in which the nobility would 
obtain its own place.27 The Catholic church with its ‘transnational matrix of 
power based on formal rationality and hierarchical leadership’ was one point of 
orientation for these nobles disenchanted with modern democratization; the other 
was the model of the Holy Roman Empire as a heterogeneous state in which the 
nobility proved to be a guarantor of the legal and economic organization of a large 
territory with conﬂ icting confessions.28
Precisely given the importance of Catholic identity for South West German and 
for Austrian nobles, monarchism was not the most natural response to the crisis 
of 1918. Among Protestant nobles, monarchism – in Austria, particularly salient 
– or its replacement with cult-leader ﬁ gures in Germany, such as Hindenburg, 
who obtained much support from nobles in 1925, was a more prominent 
response. Nobles from the peripheries of the former empires in particular, such as 
the prominent Ledebur, Schwarzenberg or Thun families in Bohemia, tended to 
advocate the unity of Germany and Austria following the model of the failed 1848 
project, but with a restoration of the nobility, rather than the nation-state principle, 
in force. However, despite these shifts in noble circles towards conservative, 
corporatist or Caesarist visions of future politics, some, though not all, of which 
blended well into the emerging Nazi ideology, there was also a small yet signiﬁ cant 
number of nobles who became interested in the alternative projects of European 
uniﬁ cation. Among these, the social democratic, the liberal and the fascist are the 
most signiﬁ cant. 
Many Baltic and Bohemian German nobles who had lost their estates and 
became journalists published ‘geopolitical’ commentaries and books reﬂ ecting on 
the past and future of Europe. Some of them became ‘nostalgic’ political ‘agnostics’, 
while others turned the nostalgic reminiscence of a past age itself into a form of 
political criticism of the present.29 For instance, the Bohemian Count Ferdinand 
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Czernin, the son of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Britain during the First 
World War, became a journalist and wrote histories and critiques of the problems 
of the old Empire, as well as critical commentaries on ongoing political affairs 
regarding Central Europe.30 Others decided to pursue an academic career that 
they had previously undertaken as a freelance pastime. For instance, the 
philosopher of biology, Jakob von Uexküll, embarked on an academic career after 
1918.31 The Baltic German novelist Otto von Taube published books reﬂ ecting on 
the political and biographical crisis of 1918.32
Intellectuals of noble status espoused the role of the politically engaged 
intellectual with more zeal after the First World War. Before the ‘upheavals’ around 
the year 1918, nobles were more directly related to the ‘political’ dimension of 
society, be it in virtue of holding some ‘feudal powers’ or simply in virtue of the 
public visibility of the noble name in political culture and history. After 1918, 
aristocratic writers turned into more explicit political theorists because this 
background had changed. Nobles themselves explained why authors like the 
Austrian Europeanist Prince Karl Anton Rohan chose to publish their works in 
Berlin rather than in Vienna, by pointing out that in Vienna ‘there is no Prince 
Rohan any more, only Karl Anton Rohan’.33
As Coudenhove-Kalergi put it, in the interwar period, ‘the only [true] Europeans 
were the writers’, mentioning authors like Heinrich Mann or Maximilian Harden.34 
Such authors published in multiple journals, their texts appeared in different forms 
and translations in a diversity of journals discussing geographical and cultural 
identity. Nobles who redeﬁ ned their very nobility through being writers but in 
doing so also communicated their noble heritage to larger publics were prominent 
among the Europeanists.35 Each of these circles had overlapping ‘members’, even 
though some of the main editors of these journals were openly critical of each 
other, as in the case of Coudenhove and Rohan.36
One of the unifying features of the group of nobles under consideration here 
was to seek out a future community in which their social status could be 
recreated.37 In this socio-literary sphere, nobles of varying degrees of nobility 
occupied a distinctive niche in theorizing Europe. The fact that such authors 
continued to be perceived as ‘former’ nobles created a special position within the 
circles of German and Austrian elites to which they belonged, comprised of 
intellectuals of different social backgrounds. After 1918, journals and publishing 
houses became important meeting grounds for like-minded intellectuals. In these 
contexts, theorists of formerly noble status had a distinctive voice.
The Case of Hermann Keyserling: 
European Renewal and the Aristocratic Sage
In his lifetime, Count Hermann Keyserling (1880–1946) enjoyed the status of a 
‘social celebrity’, philosopher and public sage. Keyserling descended from the 
Teutonic knights (Ritteradel) which had settled in the Baltic region in the twelfth 
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century, and from Russian nobility. As the author of a number of works on 
European identity, he was also an inﬂ uential theorist of the idea of Europe. His 
works combined critiques of contemporary Europe with the prophecy of a 
future supranational European state: ﬁ rst in the orientalist Travel Diary of a 
Philosopher (1918), then in his book Europe (Das Spektrum Europas) (1928); and 
ﬁ nally, in his South American Meditations (1932).38 As an intellectual, his biggest 
source of fame was his much acclaimed Travel Diary of a Philosopher, which 
introduced travel as an existential experience and a form of cultural criticism to 
a European readership in the aftermath of the First World War.39 Keyserling 
undertook a comparative analysis of the links between high society and cultural 
excellence with regard to Chinese, Latin American and European cultures, 
indicating the need for a future aristocracy. 
Following his return from his ﬁ rst trip around the world, Keyserling’s life had 
taken a sharp turn. ‘Between 1918 and 1920, centuries have passed’, Keyserling 
later summed up the changes of this period.40 After the peace of Brest Litovsk of 
1918, when the Republic of Estonia (Eesti) was founded, part of Keyserling’s 
province of Livonia was incorporated into it, and Keyserling changed his 
citizenship from being a Russian subject to becoming an Estonian citizen.41 With 
the Estonian government’s Land Reform Act of 10 October 1919, land ownership 
by the Baltic German families, who had owed up to 58 per cent of Estonian land, 
was abolished.42 This radical change in his personal circumstances opened up a 
new career for Keyserling: he became a public intellectual and turned this into a 
profession of its own, making some of his living from royalties, while marrying 
into the Bismarck family. In this capacity, Keyserling founded the School of 
Wisdom, an academy whose goal was to train future leaders who were culturally 
rooted, yet also had an identity as Europeans open for dialogue with other, non-
European, cultures. What was crucial about aristocracy in general, he thought, 
was not blood, but the public belief in the fact that it was a superior caste. Whilst 
criticizing European culture for its petty nationalism and lack of men of large 
stature, he sought to infuse those he educated at the school with the knowledge 
of other cultures in which a hierarchical order existed. His work constitutes the 
most poignant synthesis of noble perspectives on Europe’s future, seen both from 
within and from without European history itself.
As another noble Europeanist based in Germany, Count Harry Kessler, recalled 
in 1918, Keyserling’s political programme demanded ‘a rapprochement from above 
between the nations as a parallel activity to the International of the proletariat’. As 
Keyserling told Kessler, ‘in questions of foreign policy we cannot be left-wing 
enough’ and have to become the ‘model socialist state: then with our population of 
70 million we would necessarily acquire a leading position in Europe’. In terms of 
the question of nationalities, Keyserling argued, we should follow ‘the Otto 
Bauerian principle’, an idea Keyserling communicated to the Foreign Ministry, 
implying that politicians should reconcile themselves to the fact that the national 
idea was at present a progressive unifying force, but that it should be abandoned as 
soon as the times were ripe for more progressive forms of political identity.43 
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Keyserling wrote along similar lines in publications on Germany’s future in 1919.44 
He strongly believed that great culture and politics were only attainable for a 
society with a strong aristocratic principle. Conservatives dubbed him the ‘red 
Count’, while liberals and socialists called him a conservative aristocrat.45
Some of his own students had reservations about his project of European 
renewal for precisely this reason. One of them, Rom Landau, later recalled that 
‘the old but powerless aristocracy’, whose representatives were among his 
students, ‘disapproved of Keyserling’s advanced ideas, and called him a ‘Socialist’.
What kept them attracted to the School was that Keyserling seemed to be creating 
a new aristocracy: a new caste in which their own ancient traditions would be 
invigorated by his spiritual reform. For the old nobility there must have been 
something very satisfactory in the promise of a new aristocratic order, essentially 
German, which was likely to carry its inﬂ uence far beyond the frontiers of a 
diminished fatherland.46
The importance of the aristocratic sages in the creation of a supranational 
Europe made up the second important characteristic of his political thought. At 
Keyserling’s Darmstadt School conferences, the notion of the leader was discussed 
in many facets, including an understanding of the leader as a hero,47 an aristocrat 
and a cleric of the Islamic kind, following very much the Carlylean history of 
hero worship.48
Keyserling’s belief in the decline of the European order was founded on his 
social and political critique of various aspects of contemporary European politics. 
His cultural critique of Europe viewed in juxtaposition with oriental and South 
American culture informed his vision of Europe’s future in similar ways. Ever 
since his Travel Diary of a Philosopher, Keyserling wrote about European identity 
‘from without’, epitomizing an eccentrist view of the Occident which was often 
compared with Spengler’s cultural criticism. ‘Spengler and Keyserling have turned 
toward the Orient for destruction and salvation of the Occident’, one reviewer 
remarked in 1928.49 In China and India, Keyserling was received by intellectuals 
who, like him, theorized on ‘continental identities’ and cultural morphologies.50
Among the most important inﬂ uences on his work was the Academy at 
Santiniketan (today known as Visva-Bharati University), founded in 1921 by the 
Bengali writer and poet Rabindranath Tagore on the location of his father’s ashram. 
Keyserling ﬁ rst met Tagore, twelve years his senior, during the Indian part of his 
world tour, in 1912, when he stayed at Tagore’s house in Calcutta, then again in 
London in 1913, and soon after the foundation of the Darmstadt School, in 1921, 
he invited Tagore on a lecture tour of Germany. Both men had taken up similar 
roles, even though Tagore’s fame surpassed that of Keyserling by far after the 
former won a Nobel Prize in 1913. Both were of noble origin but also critical of 
the ossiﬁ cation of nobility; both were in some sense nationalists but at the same 
time considered their mission to be reaching humanity at large, and therefore 
travelled the world to give public lectures and, not least, receive ﬁ nancial backing 
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for their educational institutions; both also took some inspiration from another 
Count, Leo Tolstoy, whose revolutionary peasant communities in Russia also 
inspired movements in South Africa. Moreover, like Keyserling, Tagore had been 
impressed by Victoria Ocampo’s cosmopolitan cultural patronage in Argentina, 
where he too stayed as an honorary guest.51
Inspired by Tagore, Keyserling positioned himself as bridging East and West. His 
intention was to turn the position of Europe between the two into an advantage, and 
criticize the old aristocratic system without rejecting it entirely.52 Even though he 
shared some premises with other elitist educational programmes of the period, 
Keyserling’s orientalist school differed markedly from the neo-classical background 
of other contemporaries. For instance, the classicist Werner Jaeger decried in 1925 
that while ‘in Beijing Rabindranath Tagore proclaims the reawakening of Asia’s soul 
to the gathered crowd of yellow-skinned students, we, tired from the World War 
and the crisis of culture, are staring at the fashionable theory of the decline of the 
West’.53 Keyserling’s school proposed an entirely different use of the comparative 
shift in cultural criticism by bringing Tagore to a gathering of the Darmstadt crowds 
and selected participants of his school at the princely palace. 
The political goals of Keyserling’s school were threefold: to assess the present 
situation of European politics as a decline into anarchy and mass culture, a period 
of radical and socialist ideas which had to be accepted; to emphasize the 
importance of aristocratic and intellectual leadership in overcoming this process 
of decline; and to learn from other cultures in preparing for a future transformation 
at the hands of aristocratic sages. In this sense, the school constituted a sharp 
break from its humanist foundations, which rested on the superiority of Western 
civilization’s Greek roots. It was not just a break from humanism, but above all a 
radically different project from that of bourgeois intellectuals. After the over-
democratized state it was in now, Keyserling concluded, the future belonged to a 
‘supranational European idea’, which would overcome the extreme democracy of 
America, and Russian Bolshevism.54 His Baltic experience showed him that the 
princely attitude of being rooted to a region and simultaneously standing ‘above 
nations’, pointed to the future of European regeneration.55
Rom Landau, recalling Tagore’s visit in 1921, hosted by the former Grand Duke 
of Hesse Ernst Ludwig, gave a sense of the appeal of the poet:
After tea we went into the neighbouring ﬁ elds, and grouped ourselves on the slope 
of a hill, on the top of which stood Keyserling and Tagore … The Indian poet 
was wearing long silk robes, and the wind played with his white hair and his long 
beard. He began to recite some of his poems in English. Though the majority of the 
listeners hardly understood more than a few words – it was only a few years after the 
war, and the knowledge of English was still very limited – the ﬂ ush on their cheeks 
showed that the presence of the poet from the East represented to them the climax 
of the whole week. There was music in Tagore’s voice, and it was a pleasure to listen 
to the Eastern melody in the words. The hill and the ﬁ elds, the poet, the Grand 
Duke and the many royal and imperial princes, Keyserling and all the philosophers 
and philistines were bathed in the glow of the evening sun.56
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Keyserling’s own intentions of learning from Tagore for the purpose of a European 
renewal had hit a nerve among his postwar audiences.57 Keyserling was particularly 
interested in proving that different cultures have always been associated with 
aristocracies. In his book reviews of ‘oriental’ cultural critics, therefore, he reserved 
critical positions, such as the views of Tagore himself, to footnotes, in which he 
commented on Tagore’s remark that Indian culture had been shaped by the 
Kshattryas, not the Brahmins, merely as ‘interesting’.58 With regard to the more 
radical movement of Mahatma Gandhi, he expressly described him as a 
‘reactionary’, because in ‘sympathising with the false progressivism of 
modernisation he denied Indian culture’.59
Another interest of Keyserling’s in comparing his contemporary ‘postwar’ 
Europe with other cultures, was his desire to relativize the impression cultivated 
by many Germans that Germany had been mistreated the most by the postwar 
political settlements. Other countries, Keyserling argued, had suffered an even 
more catastrophic decline, drawing attention to Turkey. Nonetheless, as he put it, 
it was due to this imperial decline that countries like Turkey or Germany would 
be able to recreate a new European order, as the Turkish intellectual Halidé Edib 
wrote in a book which she sent to Keyserling with a dedication.60
Keyserling espoused a form of neo-aristocratic internationalism that was 
attractive to a number of nobles in his position. He argued that a new aristocracy 
would be necessary in order to give shape and cohesion to a new political structure 
of the future, which would no doubt be ‘supranational’. Only a reformed 
aristocracy could offer such a structure.61 In this new state of the future, the ‘idea 
of quality’ would be absolutely central, for even now, alongside processes of 
internationalization, ‘an aristocratic order’ was in the making. Yet the path of 
socialist transformation, which, according to Keyserling, was necessary before this 
stage was reached, was rejected by many of his readers. Keyserling, like 
Coudenhove, not only had a distinctly non-racialist view of the ideal nobleman, 
but also accepted certain features of modern civilization, such as fascism and 
socialism, with a degree of fatalism, as transitory stages towards a different order. 
Keyserling believed that the European ‘knight’ of the future would return as a 
‘sage’. Nietzsche was a central source of inspiration for this idea.62 There was thus 
in his eyes no contradiction between espousing socialist radicalism, succumbing 
in a fatalist sense to the Nazi revolt, and being a neo-aristocratic theorist of Europe. 
As Prince Karl Anton Rohan wrote in his book Europe, ﬁ rst published in 1923, 
the old ‘nobility’ now had ‘to transform the old values in a conservative way, 
according to its tradition, using the new impulses of the revolution’. Unlike the 
class struggle that motivates the Bolshevik conception of the revolution, he 
thought, the goal of this one was the creation of a ‘uniﬁ ed Europe’ instead of an 
‘ideological brotherhood of mankind’.63 Count Keyserling, in his correspondence 
with Rohan, engaged in theorizing the new status of the nobility further. He 
described to him that he was also, ‘under conditions of utmost secrecy’, working 
on a ‘vision for all the peoples of Europe’.64 Keyserling had already sent Rohan a 
letter ‘concerning the nobility’ for Rohan’s private circle of ‘friends’ studying the 
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‘problem of nobility’ under his ‘guidance’, and he was supposed to contribute a 
chapter on ‘Germany’s Task in the World’ to a forthcoming publication on Germany 
and France to be edited by the Prince.65 In the proposal for an edited book on 
Germany and France, Rohan lined up not only well-known historians and legal 
theorists like the German nationalist historian Hermann Oncken and the 
constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt, but also now forgotten German and French 
authors who fall into the suggested category of ‘aristocratic writers’. They included 
names such as Wladimir d’Ormesson, Alfred Fabre-Luce, Henry de Montherlant 
and Knight Heinrich von Srbik. Keyserling, in turn, also used Rohan’s network of 
relatives and acquaintances among the German-speaking Habsburg nobles in 
Bohemia to promote his own work. In this connection, he approached Rohan’s 
elder brother Prince Alain, as well as members of the oldest Austro-Bohemian 
noble families like Count Erwein Nostitz, Count Karl Waldstein, Count Feri 
Kinsky, Countess Ida Schwarzenberg, Count Coudenhove, Senator Count Eugen 
Ledebur and other, exclusively noble, families that he wanted to win over as 
‘donors’ for his own project of a ‘School of Wisdom’ for the creation of future 
European leaders.66
Keyserling’s work shows particularly poignantly the extent to which those 
belonging to the historical nobility combined the consciousness of belonging to 
an ‘aristocracy’ with the emphasis of generational, patrilineal descent from a family 
that claimed as its property a particular territory, and to which other social groups 
owed a speciﬁ c form of ‘ﬁ delity’.67 Instead of reconciling themselves with the new 
state forms, or seeking to resist them entirely, some nobles envisioned a new 
European order to replace the old regime, and treated the politics of the 
present as a political intermezzo – what Nietzsche called ‘entr’acte politics’ 
(Zwischenaktspolitik).68 While, broadly speaking, this was a shared perception of 
the present as a caesura before a new future European politics among intellectuals 
of different social backgrounds, for nobles, the crisis of noble status as a symbol 
of the decline of ‘old Europe’ gave the crisis conundrum of ‘World War I’ a 
particular connotation.69
Noble Perspectives on Europe: Crisis, the Need for Aristocracy, 
and the Critique of Bourgeois Values
The reinterpretation of a strong politics of the future in conjunction with a revision 
of what constituted the nobility was an expression of noble authors’ belonging to 
a generation of Nietzscheans. The theoretical impulses all three thinkers – 
Keyserling, Rohan and Coudenhove – derived from Nietzsche as a critical 
‘historian’ of the nobility, as a philologist of the meaning of ‘what is noble’ and, as 
his Danish contemporary Georg Brandes put it, as an ‘aristocratic radical’ 
demanding that culture be agonistic, provided the most important intellectual 
foundations for twentieth-century German nobles as political theorists. If 
Nietzsche had only invented his status of a Polish nobleman for himself, there 
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were ‘actual’, albeit now ‘former’, nobles who thought of themselves as particularly 
suitable to lead the process of an intellectual ‘revaluation of values’. Nietzsche’s 
project of a genealogy of morality as a preparation for a revaluation of values 
proved highly attractive to noble intellectuals, who saw the philosopher’s work as 
a foundation for their own reinvention of their status.70
Noble Europeanists interpreted Nietzsche’s notorious ‘good Europeanism’ as a 
politics of the future whose continuity with the past would be provided by a new 
form of ‘aristocratic society’.71 Importantly, in their reception of Nietzsche, noble 
Europeanists differed markedly from the later Nazi readings of his thought.72 For, 
unlike Nazi attempts at radically equating nobility and racial purity, they believed 
that future ‘good Europeans’ would continue to have an ‘aristocratic’ ‘pathos of 
distance’ within the new society. Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil distinguished 
between two forms of ‘uniﬁ cation’ process of Europe. One, which he evaluated 
negatively, was the ‘democratic movement’ that caused the process of ‘assimilation 
of the Europeans’. The outcome was a ‘supranational’, ‘nomadic’ kind of human 
being, whose main skill was ‘adaptation’.73 One could describe the interpretations 
of Nietzsche adopted by the three German-speaking aristocratic writers as a 
demand for a new European order with an aristocratic hegemony. 
In their capacity as intellectuals, noble writers offered a particular interpretation 
of the European crisis as a crisis of noble values, and their pessimism about 
Europe’s future combined scepticism about liberal democracies with a particular 
concern for the loss of social hierarchy. In keeping with this, the supranationalism 
that informed their political views was the perspective of an elite that could 
coexist comfortably with lower social strata holding nationalist or other kinds of 
political beliefs. Finally, nobles engaged in critiques of bourgeois values from a 
radically different perspective than Marxists, of course, yet they drew a remarkable 
amount from Marxist literature.
Historians so far have viewed interwar Europeanism as an ‘elitist’ or ‘neo-
aristocratic’ discourse associated both with ‘noble’ and with ‘bourgeois’ thinkers.74 
Europeanism has also been discussed as one of several interwar conceptualizations 
of the ‘new human type’.75 Scholars have rightly associated this ‘elitist’ discourse 
about politics with the ‘noble-bourgeois’ segment of German and Austrian society. 
But in order to understand the speciﬁ c character of interwar Europeanism more 
fully, the biographical experience of its authors needs to be reconstructed not only 
in terms of individual authors, but also in terms of their belonging to groups with 
particular ‘horizons’ of experience, as is the case with nobles. Authors like 
Coudenhove, Rohan and Keyserling were not only part of a general transformation 
of the intellectual sphere after the First World War, but they occupied a particular 
position in this sphere.76 Historians of political concepts such as the ‘nation’ have 
frequently explained their changing meanings by referring to key historical events 
in which these terms were negotiated afresh. In the case of the modern concepts 
of the ‘nation’ or ‘democracy’, such a key event is obviously the French 
Revolution.77 For nobles, the twentieth-century déjà-vu Jacobinism of most 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe was a phenomenon of comparative 
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impact on their political imagination: thereafter, Europeanism was a response to 
this Neo-Jacobinism not only in terms of being a supranational discourse, but also 
in terms of being the language of an old elite whose status was under threat. 
Disclosing their views on Europe’s future in political journals and even in 
works of ﬁ ction offered intellectuals of noble origin a stage on which to reinvent 
themselves not only in the eyes of other nobles, but also among the German and 
Austrian intellectual elite at large. Their in many ways forward-looking ideas of 
European identity, the cosmopolitan comparative analysis of other cultures which 
they undertook in this context, and in some cases, even the willingness expressed 
by nobles such as Harry Kessler to welcome liberal democratic and socialist forms 
of European political power, should not obscure the fact that interwar Europeanism 
was also shrouded in a defensive attempt at preserving the cultural community of 
a lost imperial world. 
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